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Summary 
We empirically test delinking of waste dynamics with regard to economic growth and the 
effectiveness of environmental and specific waste-related policies, by exploiting a newly 
constructed, integrated waste-economic-policy dataset based on official data for the EU15 
for 1995-2007. We find that absolute delinking for waste generation is far from being 
achieved in the EU despite fairly stringent and longstanding policy commitment that goes 
back to the mid 1990s, but which however is biased towards waste management and waste 
disposal rather than waste prevention. Policy as well as country structural factors seem to 
impact instead on landfill diversion. Nevertheless, country heterogeneity matters: SURE 
based analyses show that EU average figures often hide high variance. Their results provide 
food for thought for a future most comprehensive EU waste policy strategy, which is now 
aimed mainly at landfill diversion, within a framework strongly oriented to allowing 
countries to decide about the implementation of EU directives. 
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Abstract 
We  empirically  test  delinking  of  waste  dynamics  with  regard  to  economic  growth  and  the 
effectiveness  of  environmental  and  specific  waste related  policies,  by  exploiting  a  newly 
constructed, integrated waste economic policy dataset based on official data for the EU15 for 
1995 2007. We find that absolute delinking for waste generation is far from being achieved in the 
EU despite fairly stringent and longstanding policy commitment that goes back to the mid 1990s, 
but which however is biased towards waste management and waste disposal rather than waste 
prevention.  Policy  as  well  as  country  structural  factors  seem  to  impact  instead  on  landfill 
diversion.  Nevertheless,  country  heterogeneity  matters:  SURE  based  analyses  show  that  EU 
average figures often hide high variance. Their results provide food for thought for a future most 
comprehensive EU waste policy strategy, which is now aimed mainly at landfill diversion, within 
a framework strongly oriented to allowing countries to decide about the implementation of EU 
directives.    
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1. Introduction and relevant frameworks 
Over the last 20 years, European environmental policies have become more oriented towards 
reducing the amount of municipal solid waste (MSW) landfilled and the promotion of other 
forms  of  waste  disposal,  such  as  recycling  and  incineration.  In  this  context,  decoupling  or 
delinking, that is, improvements in environmental/resource indicators with respect to economic 
activity indicators, is increasingly used to evaluate progress in the use/conservation of natural and 
environmental  resources.  The  Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  is 
doing  extensive work  on  decoupling  indicators  for  reporting  and  policy  evaluation  purposes 
(OECD, [57]). Various decoupling or resource efficiency indicators are included in the European 
Environment  Agency’s  (EEA)  state of the environment  reports  (EEA,  [24],  [25]),  and  a  few 
European  countries  have  begun  to  include  indicators  of  delinking  in  official  analyses  of 
environmental  performance  (DEFRA/DTI,  [18]).  Furthermore,  (EEA  ETC/RWM,  [26]) 
highlights the importance of market based instruments for achieving a higher degree of delinking 
for waste  indicators. The  European  Union  (EU) policy  thematic  strategies  on  resources  and 
waste, include reference to absolute and relative delinking indicators (EEA, [22]; Jacobsen et al., 
[37]).  The  former  is  a  negative  relationship  between  economic  growth  and  environmental 
impacts,  associated  with  the  descending  side  of  an  inverted  U shape,  according  to  the 
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) framework. The latter, the ascending side of the U shape, is 
a positive, but decreasing in size, income environment relationship. This represents a positive 
lower than unity elasticity in economic terms. There is no delinking observed on the ascending 
part of the EKC and, in addition, there is unity or higher than unity elasticity. The EKC literature 
has moved from basic conceptual intuitions and stylised/empirical facts, which traditionally fed 
EKC  analysis,  to  the  search  for  theoretical  foundations. An  extensive  overview  of  the  main   4 
theoretical issues (first developed by Andreoni and Levison, [3])
2 can be found in Brock and 
Taylor [8]. The field of economics of waste includes studies that date back before the 1980s 
(Richardson  and  Havlicek,  [61];  Choe  and  Fraser,  [13];  Beede  and  Bloom,  [7]),  and  which 
increasingly emphasize policy aspects (Palmer et al., [58]; Walls and Palmer, [68]). Due to data 
availability, applied analysis has lagged behind theoretical analysis until recently (Johnstone and 
Labonne, [38]).  
Increased delinking is the primary aim for waste, which, in terms of its environmental impacts 
and economic costs, is no less relevant than climate change and is also related to it given the 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions generated by various disposal options (Andersen et al., [1]). 
Andersen et al. [2] estimates waste trends for the EU 15 and the EU 10 new entrants, and finds 
that waste generation is linked to economic activities by non constant trend ratios. This rather 
descriptive analysis of delinking in EU countries forecasts increased relative delinking; it does not 
confirm  the  EKC  evidence.  Projections  for  2005 2020  for  the  UK,  France  and  Italy,  show 
growth in MSW of around 15 20 per cent, which, at least at first sight, may be compatible with 
relative  delinking  with  respect  to  GDP  (gross  domestic  product)  and  consumption  growth. 
Figures 1 2 show the state of the art in the EU regarding waste generation and landfilling across 
countries.  
                                                           
2  Then other works followed in providing theoretical explanations for the EKC (among others Kelly, [41]; Chimeli 
and Braden, [11], [12]).   5 
Figure 1   MSW generation in Europe. 1995 2007. (1000= 1Million tons) 
 
Source: Eurostat  




EEA [22] shows that countries can be categorised under three waste management groupings, 
based on the strategies for diverting municipal waste away from landfill, and the relative shares of   6 
landfilling,  materials  recovery  (mainly  recycling  and  composting)  and  incineration.  A  first 
grouping comprises countries with high levels of both materials recovery and incineration, and 
relatively low levels of landfill, a second grouping includes countries with high materials recovery 
rates, medium incineration levels and medium dependence on landfill, while the third group of 
countries  has  low  levels  of  both  materials  recovery  and  incineration,  and  relatively  high 
dependence on landfill (EEA, [23]). Although costs and benefits should be evaluated specifically 
for each situation, the environmental impacts of landfilling and waste sites mostly in urban areas 
are massive (Pearce, [59]; Eshet et al., [28]; Ilhanfeldt and Taylor, [35]; Jenkins et al., [39]; Seok 
Lim  and  Missios,  [63];  Lang,  [43]).  And  although  recycling  is  at  the  top  of  the  EU’s 
environmental waste hierarchy, it should not be taken by default as best economic practice in all 
situations;  its  costs  and  benefits  are  influenced  by  economic  and  technological  factors.  For 
examples of economic assessments of different waste disposal strategies, see Pearce [59] and 
Dijkgraaf  and Vollebergh [19] among others. The focus has shifted over the last 3 4 years to the 
role of waste in production and consumption processes and how prevention of waste and better 
waste management can contribute to more sustainable outcomes. 
In the long run, waste reduction at source, through the imposition of policy targets in terms of 
waste  generated  per  capita,  is  probably  the  most  effective  and  most  efficient  answer  to  the 
problem. Given the potentially high costs in the short run and resistance from member states, the 
first  phase  of  policy  implementation  at  EU level focuses  on  landfill  diversion  and  increased 
shares  of  recycling/recovery,  including  incineration.  For  the  purposes  of  our  analysis, which 
focuses on the income waste relationship in specific states as well as the average EU relationship, 
it is worth noting that members states, following the guidelines in the 2008 new waste framework 
directive
3, are expected to set up and propose to the EU Commission a waste policy strategy that 
                                                           
3 Even the revised 2008 Waste Framework Directive, which was expected eventually to include some per capita 
targets for  MSW generation, although it explicitly reassesses the objective of delinking and the necessity for using 
economic policy instruments to tackle waste externalities according to relative social costs, does not ultimately fix   7 
includes waste prevention, by 2013. This might even include waste generation per capita targets, 
currently  in  place  only  in  Hungary  and  the  region  of  Flanders  in  Belgium.  Country  based 
evidence  is  a  necessary  piece  of  the  puzzle.  It  should  be  noted  also  that  the  EU  Belgian 
presidency in 2009 launched an agenda based on the objectives of a ‘EU recycling society’ and a 
EU green economy. The attention on waste management and waste policy will increase. 
In  light  of  future  scenarios,  there  is  a  real  need  to  analyse  empirically  whether  the  policies 
implemented  so  far  have  been  effective  in  changing  the  endogenous  relationship  between 
economic growth and waste trends. In other words, given that waste policies are motivated by 
the various negative externalities arising at different stages of the life cycle (at source, at disposal 
level), ex ante cost benefit analysis would provide indications about the most effective option to 
pursue and the right level of tax to impose. Ex post effectiveness analysis would assess the short 
and long run effects of policies on the ultimate objective (IVM, [36]): to drive down the waste 
Kuznets curve (WKC). In the absence of effective policies, we can expect a somewhat linear 
positive relationship between waste generation and growth, with landfill diversion being affected 
only by market prices and the opportunity costs (of land). 
 Delinking trends in industrial materials and energy have been scrutinised in the advanced 
countries for several decades (for examples of early work on development and environment see 
Tilton [67] on metals/materials, and Martin [48] on energy for an extensive review). In the 1990s, 
research  on  delinking  was  extended  to  include  air  pollution  and  GHG  emissions,  including 
analyses of the relationship between pollution and economic growth, which are encompassed in 
the EKC. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
waste prevention targets. Art. 9 on waste prevention sets future actions only in terms of stating that by the end of 
2014, waste prevention and decoupling objectives for 2020 will be presented, and art. 29 indicates that countries 
should prepare waste prevention programmes by 2013 (the EEA is required to report annually on this evolution 
from 2008 to 2013), with delinking performance to be evaluated every 6 years. It seems clear that absolute delinking 
for MSW generation is not present, and EU member countries have managed to postpone specific waste generation 
per capita targets. 
   8 
In the waste realm,  delinking analyses are still scarce. One of the earliest WKC studies is Cole 
et  al.  [16], which  finds  no  evidence  of  an  inverted  U shape  in  relation  to  municipal waste. 
Fischer Kowalski and Amann [29] analysed the richer OECD countries, over the period 1975 
1995, and found that absolute delinking holds for landfilled waste, but not waste generated. This 
suggests, as can be seen from the descriptive analyses, that the evidence for waste generation and 
waste  disposal  varies,  depending  on  improved  performance  in  waste  recovery.  A  study  by 
Johnstone and Labonne [38] uses a panel database on solid waste in the OECD countries to 
provide evidence on the economic and demographic determinants of rates of household solid 
waste generation, regressed over consumption expenditure, urbanisation and population density. 
Kaurosakis [40] deals with policy evaluation, and presents evidence on the determinants of waste 
generation and the driving forces behind the proportions of paper and glass that are recycled, 
and the proportion of waste that goes to land fill. Recent studies by Mazzanti and Zoboli [51] 
analyse EU 15 and EU 25 panel data for all waste trends (from generation to landfill, including 
recycling and incineration) for 1995–2005, and find some weak evidence of delinking and signs 
of  policy  effectiveness;  others  focus  on  the  international  and  policy  relevant  issue  of  trans 
boundary shipments of waste (Baggs, [5]). From a regional studies and trade based perspective, 
spatial issues are attracting the attention of researchers (Ley et al., [44]; Mazzanti et al., [54]). 
Recent studies on waste and environmental policy are collected in Mazzanti and Montini (50).  
This article provides empirical evidence on delinking trends for MSW generated and MSW 
landfilled, using both fixed effect models and seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE). 
The importance of this analysis is huge: on the one hand it provides a deeper investigation into 
delinking trends in waste sector across European countries and on the other it provides ex post 
evaluation of different policy related variables. In addition, it includes a novel application of 
SURE models to delinking analysis in the waste sector that takes account of slope heterogeneity. 
The main attractions of Zellner’s [69] SURE is that it make it possible to exploit cross sectional 
correlation in the panel (if present), estimating single equations for each individual country. This   9 
enables us to correct for the presence of contemporaneous correlations across cross sectional 
units allowing the slope to change across different individuals. In addition to the important 
statistical implications of this estimator, the real value of SURE in this field is the possibility to 
account  for  slope  heterogeneity,  which  enables  a  deeper  understanding  of  the  different 
behaviours of different countries, based on country level evidence of delinking. Our analysis is 
thus developed along three steps. In the first step we apply a traditional fixed effects model then, 
after testing for cross sectional correlation,
4 in the second step we apply SURE (if necessary) first 
constraining all slopes to be equal, and finally we allow slopes to change across individuals in the 
third  step.  Comparison  of  the  results  provides  an  in  depth  understanding  of  the  delinking 
process, and especially of the differences in delinking trends across countries. 
The literature includes examples of delinking studies that use SURE or  a random coefficients 
linear  regression  model  (Swamy,  [66]),  in  order  to  account  for  the  presence  of  slope 
heterogeneity. One well known example is List and Gallet [45], who using a long dataset on 
NOx and SO2 per capita emissions for US countries during the period 1929 1994, tested for the 
presence of an EKC, using a fixed effects model and then applying SURE. Allowing for slope 
heterogeneity, they find very different turning points with respect to the aggregate analysis, with 
on average higher turning points for NOx and lower for SO2. Cole [14], using fixed effects and 
random  coefficients  estimators,  study  the  relationship  between  income  and  three  different 
pollutants: NOx for the years 1975,1980,1985 and 1990; SO2 and CO2 for 1984 2000, for a wide 
group of countries. Cole finds different results from the two estimation techniques used: he 
emphasises that allowing for slope heterogeneity in the panel may alter the results of the simple 
fixed effects model. Using random coefficients models he finds evidence of an EKC only for 
one pollutant (NOx), while fixed effects shows evidence of EKC for all the pollutants he studies. 
                                                           
4 As mentioned before, SUR estimators correct for the presence of cross sectional correlation in the panel. For this 
reason after the fixed effects estimation we present some tests for cross sectional dependence, including the Breusch 
pagan statistic for cross sectional independence in the residuals of a fixed effect regression model (Greene, [31]), and 
a similar test proposed by Pesaran [60], more suitable for panels with small T and large N.   10
He also finds a significant difference in slope coefficients among different countries, confirming 
his hypothesis that a single slope model may pose too strong a restriction on the data.  Halkos 
[33], exploiting a dataset used also by Stern and Common [64], tests for the presence of EKC in 
SO2 emissions during the period 1960 90, for 73 OECD and non OECD countries.  
A compelling recent study using SURE is by Martinez Espineira and Lantz [49], who use the 
traditional EKC framework to study bird abundance in nine Canadian provinces, during the 
period  1968 2007,  using  a  seemingly  unrelated  regressions  approach.  They  find  significant 
heterogeneity among provinces in relation to bird abundance: some of them see a turning point 
after 30,000 dollars, while in others the threshold is between 10,000 and 20,000 dollars. Also, in 
this case, slope heterogeneity is significant, confirming the hypothesis that within single states 
there may be considerable differences in environmental performances.  
The original aim of our analysis is to bring together delinking analysis and policy assessment. 
Policy efforts are analysed in terms of their effectiveness in reducing waste generation,  on the 
basis of the actions taken in response to the implementation of the policies relevant to the case 
considered here: namely the 1999 Landfill and Incineration Directives,
5 and more generally the 
commitment and effort of EU countries to implementing waste policies, including early ‘policy 
actions’ with regard to formal policy ratification, by some countries (e.g. Germany, Austria put in 
place a packaging waste management system).  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the empirical model. We 
stress the uniqueness of a long panel and merged data at world level for waste, and the relevance 
of testing both official EUROSTAT environmental policy indicators and newly constructed – 
                                                           
5 The Landfill Directive adopts two approaches: first it introduces stringent technical requirements for landfills; 
second,  it  diverts  biodegradable  municipal  waste  (BMW)  from  landfills  by  setting  targets  for  the  landfill  of 
Biodegradable municipal Waste (BMW) in 2006, 2009 and 2016. The Incineration Directive (2000/76/EC on the 
incineration of waste) is an ancillary and complementary piece of EU waste policy strategy which includes the 
Waste Framework Directive, legislation that was revised at the end of 2008, but which still does not identify clear 
policy targets.   11
from EU waste official sources – indexes of policy stringency. Section 3 presents main results 
for the fixed effects and SURE models. Section 4 concludes, commenting on results with policy 
implications.    
 
2. Data and empirical model 
We exploit a dataset composed of the 15 European countries (EU15), for the period 1995 2007 
to  test  delinking  paths  and  the  effectiveness  of  policy,  controlling  for  socio  economic  and 
structural factors, in determining waste performances
6. The two dependent variables are MSW 
collected, and solid waste landfilled, expressed in per capita ratios derived from EUROSTAT. 
Our main economic driver, as in other WKC studies, is data on final consumption expenditure 
by households, because this is considered to be better than GDP in this kind of study. Estimates 
(not shown) that exploit GDP present very similar results: this is a kind of sensitivity test. We 
include some other variables to control for socio economic and policy aspects. First, population 
density  since  it  is  likely  to  impact  on  waste  generation  –  with  ambiguous  sign  given  that 
urbanisation forces could drive up generation while economies of scale may after some point of 
waste quantity drive down collection of waste   and negatively on waste landfilled at micro and 
macroeconomic levels. In terms of construction of the policy indices, we exploit the country fact 
sheets  available  at  EIONET
7  to  compile  an  original  index  of  policy  stringency,  which, 
interestingly, varies over time and across countries, and EUROSTAT data relative to the total 
amount of environmental taxation (not energy) per GDP in European countries. The index 
constructed (fig. 3) is a proxy for national policies for the time period examined. It captures all 
possible  information  on  national  implementation  of  waste  related  policies  (MSW,  packaging 
                                                           
6 We do not use EU27 data given the current lower availability and reliability of waste data for ‘newcomers’ eastern 
EU countries. 
7 EIONET is a partnership agency of the EEA and its member countries; it is fundamental to the collection and 
organisation of data for the EEA.   12
waste,  end  of  life  vehicles,  landfill  taxation  etc.).  We  use  the  country  studies  available  at 
EIONET as our information source. This index is extremely comprehensive with regard to 
landfill  directive  related  variables,
8  and  captures  some  of  the  waste  prevention  features  of 
national policies.
9 It is consistent with a comprehensive environmental policy approach, which is 
not based on single economic instrument, discussed theoretically by Walls and Palmer [69]. 
Figure 3 – The policy index 
 
Source: own calculation on EIONET data 
 
We  introduce  total  number  of  environmental  management  system  (EMS)  certifications, a 
factor that indirectly capture some effects of the packaging directive effects on firm behaviour 
                                                           
8 Thus, in any given year, each country is associated with an index value, where 1 is the maximum potential value 
(assuming the presence of all the policies considered). We differentiate between the presence of a strategy (low value) 
and an effective regulatory policy (high value). The latter is assigned a bigger weight (0 for no policy, 1 for strategy 
only, 2 for a policy). Prominent examples of overall environmental policy performance indices, for several countries, 
based on a synthesis of diverse policy performances, can be found in Eliste and Fredrikkson [27] and Dasgupta et al. 
[17]. Cagatay and Mihci ([9]; [10]) provide an index of environmental sensitivity performance for 1990 1995, for 
acidification, climate change, water and even waste management.  
9 Altthough specific waste prevention targets/actions do not exist, (landfill related) policy variables can be included 
even at this level of analysis. We can hypothesise that the backward effects of landfill policies and waste management 
actions on the amounts of MSW generated are not significant. Nevertheless, since our synthetic policy index also 
captures the variety of waste measures implemented by a country in addition to landfill diversion actions, some 
effects may emerge.    13
or, more generally, ‘market innovativeness’ in the waste management practices characterising a 
country.  Environmental  certification  is  often  tested  as  a  possible  driver  of  environmental 
performance (Arimura et al., [4]; Barla, [6]). This is a more a market based factor linked to the 
techno organisational  innovation  process  eventually  influencing  environmental  performances, 
and eventually responding to regulatory pressure. Future applied work should test also whether 
other  market  based  factors  such  as  market  structure  are  relevant  for  explaining  waste 
performances (Fleckinger and Glachant, [30]). 
 The data we use derive mainly from EUROSTAT structural indicators  datasets, and are 
summarised in Table 1 which highlights the main research hypotheses.  
The specification that we test is a common EKC based (Cole et al., [15] Stern and Common, 
[65]; Maddison, [46]) reduced form (for waste related studies, see Dijkgraaf and Gradus, [20], 
[21]; Mazzanti and Zoboli, [51]). We do not include a third term in the income environment 
polynomial  due  to  its  irrelevance  in  the  waste  framework  (at  best  the  presence  of  relative 
delinking is proved ): 
(1) Log (Waste per capita performance indicator
10) = β0i + αt + β1Log(C) it + β2Log(C)
2
 it + β3(Xi) it 
+ β4(Zi) it + eit 
where X includes socio economic/structural factors (DENSPOP) and Z includes policy/market 
levers (POLIND, ENVTAX, and EMAS). The relation is estimated first with the fixed effects 
model then with the SURE technique, constraining all the slopes in a first phase and setting 
them free to change across individual estimations in the second step.
11 The analysis is conducted 
                                                           
10 Either landfilled waste or waste generated in our paper. Incinerated waste is not included due to lower coverage 
even in the EU15. 
11 In this last step  we voluntarily dropped 3 countries, in  order to allow estimation of the SURE  model  with 
unconstrained slopes. This is because we have a relatively small T and without the exclusion of at least 3 countries it 
would not be possible to estimate this last regression. For this reason, in the first phase of the work, we dropped all 
observation relating to the 3 countries with the lowest amounts of waste generation, and the three countries with the 
lowest levels amount of waste landfilled in the second phase of the analysis.   14
first using MSW as the dependent variable and then MSW landfilled, in order to assess the trends 
in two of the main variables in waste management. Wherever possible, logarithmic values are 
used. 
Table 1   Descriptive statistics and summary of research hypotheses 
  Variables   Acronyms 
Units of 
measurement 















Consumption  CONS 
[€ per 
inhabitant] 







Population density  DENSPOP 
[inhabitants/ 
Km2] 























Waste related policy  POLIND  0 1 index  0.45  0  0.95 






EMS innovation  EMS 
% National 
consumption 




                                                           
12 Although positive correlation between policies and country environmental commitment can be and were found, 
dependent on endogeneity of policy action with respect to income level, the production of public environmental 
goods being a public good and luxury goods being helped by income conditions and by the health of public finances. 
Vicious or virtuous circles thus are possible paths in the environmental income dynamics.    15
3. Econometric evidence 
3.1 Waste generation drivers 
In the fixed effects analysis (results in Table 2), the core specification shows a relative delinking 
associated with a quite low elasticity with respect to previous estimates, which remains in the 
range 0.31 to 0.38 across all the specifications tested.
13 This may be preliminary evidence that the 
EU  15  group  is  still  far  from  absolute  delinking,  although  progress  is  being  made  towards 
delinking.
14  In any case, this may be seen as a problematic result, considering that on the one 
side, waste prevention is at the top of EU waste hierarchy along with recycling, and on the other 
side  and  even  more  important,  prevention  at  source  is  probably  the  most  effective  way  of 
promoting waste management sustainability. Moving to the socio economic control, we see that 
population  density  is  never  statistically  significant.  Also  not  significant  are  the  three  policy 
variables tested: policy index, environmental taxation and EMAS certification as market/policy 
lever. Similarly, we expect the total amount of environmental taxes to be negatively correlated to 
the  total  amount  of  waste  generated  and  positively  to  landfill  diversion.  We  have  the  same 
expectations for EMAS certification. Nevertheless, this result is not unexpected, considering that 
waste  policies  do  not  put  specific  emphasis  on  waste  prevention  but  are  usually  seen  as  an 
instrument to optimise waste management systems. Similarly, the amount of environmental taxes, 
which could be considered a proxy for commitment to environmental issues, does not alter the 
Kuznets  delinking  relation,  which  is  in  line  with  the  lack  of  specific  emphasis  on  waste 
prevention in these policy efforts.
15  Finally, EMAS certification was expected to have a positive 
correlation  to  waste  prevention,  being  a  proxy  for  product  innovation  and  environmentally 
                                                           
13 The squared term is not presented because it is never statistically significant. 
14 Mazzanti et al., [52] found an elasticity of 0.772, using Eurostat Data from 1995 to 2005. The inclusion of years 
2006 and 2007 reduces the income/waste elasticity, showing an improvement in environmental performances at the 
EU15 level. 
15 Moreover, a huge part of this variable is related to landfill tax in most countries. In Italy, e.g., 80% of such 
environmental taxation is linked to landfill tax revenues, as national statistical data show. In general, in the EU 
landfill tax comprises the major share of environmental taxes. One famous example is the UK landfill tax introduced 
in 1999 (Morris et al., [55]; Martin and Scott, [47]).    16
oriented production, but this variable is not significant. One reason may be the high variance of 
this factor in the EU, with Germany a clear outlier and other countries lagging behind with 
relatively new adoption dating only from the late 1990s – early 2000s for most. To deal with the 
endogeneity of policy commitment with regard to income levels we implement three different 
consistency tests, presented in Table A2 in the appendix. In the first two we used respectively  
the first and the second lag of POLIND as the policy proxy, in the third we instrument POLIND 
with its lag. Tests confirm  the results obtained in the main analysis.   
Table 2   Waste Generation: Fixed effect model  
  FEM  FEM  FEM  FEM 
CONS  0.35***       0.38***  0.33***  0.31*** 
DENSPOP  0.18  0.17  0.26  0.28 
POLIND  …   0.02  …  … 
EMS  …  …  0.17  … 
ENVTAX  …  …  …   0.04 
         
Pesaran test16  0.0088  0.0090  0.4601  0.0024 
F test  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Note: In all the estimation we use the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance adjusted for correlations in the error terms over time within 
individuals (but not across individuals). This means that we consider that Var(εit) = σ2εit   i=1,.., N, t=1,…,T, and that Cov(εit, εis) ≠ 0    t ≠ s. 
(…) means not included; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively; F test shows overall significance for all 
regressions; R squared presents reasonably high values for panel settings. EMAS data are available only for the period 1997 2007, and EMAS 
estimation does not include Germany because it is a strong outlier. Environmental tax data are not available for year 1995.   
 
The results of the Pesaran (presented in Table 2) and Breusch Pagan (presented in Table 3)  tests 
show that the residual of the fixed effects model are affected by contemporaneous correlations 
across cross sectional units, which can be exploited by techniques such as SURE models, which 
allow efficiency gains. Table 3 summarises the regression results from the first of the two SURE 
models for waste generation. This is a first possible model in which we constrain all the slopes to 
being equal; a kind of fixed effects with serial correction which is usually implemented in the 
econometric literature to cope with correlations remaining within a framework of homogeneous 
slope.  
                                                           
16  Breusch pagan test results, not shown for reasons of space, are consistent with these results.   17
As we can see this ‘correction’ does not alter significantly the economic and statistical meaning of 
previous results.
17 Some new insights emerge however. If on the one hand, both specifications we 
test show significance of the squared term, demonstrating a Kuznets like path, this is nonetheless 
associated with a very high, and clearly ‘out of range with respect to the observed values’, turning 
point. In other words, there is still only relative delinking. The economic meaning is unchanged. 
The policy index is again not significant, while population density is. In this case, population 
density is linked to a negative and economically and statistically significant coefficient (Ziliak and 
McCloskey,  [70]),  suggesting  that  economies  of  scale  related  to  agglomeration  may  have  a 
positive effect with respect to waste prevention. We recall that there are no a priori expectations 
about this sign since opposite forces are at work; the corrected model changes (increases) the 
significance threshold as a result of higher efficiency.
18  
 
Table 3   Waste generated. SURE Model, constrained slopes. 
  Constrained slope SURE 
Constrained slope SURE – all 
variables 
CONS  0.95***  1.19*** 
CONS2   0.03***   0.038*** 
DENSPOP  …   0.29*** 
POLIND  …   0.002 
TP [CONS per capita, millions of  €]  7.521  6.311 
Breusch Pagan test of independence 
(chi2) 
0.000  0.000 
Note:. (…) means not included; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
 
                                                           
17 As already mentioned, SURE refers only to 12 of the 15 countries. The countries with the lowest levels of waste 
production, i.e. Luxembourg (330.473 Kg); Finland (2.675.416 Kg) and Ireland (3.389.645 Kg), were dropped from 
the data set to allow SURE given the constraints. See Table A1 in the appendix for a general overview.  
18 Some further estimates that constrain only CONS while leaving DENSPOP and POLIND unconstrained in 
scope, show that 4 countries are characterized by a positive coefficient (+) for density: France, Greece, Italy, Sweden; 
8 have a negative coefficient (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK. For 
POLIND, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK show a positive sign while for 
France, Germany, Greece, and Sweden the sign is negative.   18
The  last  model  we  present  for  waste  generation  (Table  4)  gives  evidence  of  country 
heterogeneity in the income/waste relationship at the EU15 level. The analysis refers only to the 
main economic variable consumption.
19 The main advantage, from an interpretative point of 
view, is the possibility to compare the trends in different countries within the same framework of 
analysis, which highlights common elements and discrepancies. For instance, Table 4 shows that 
it is possible to split countries into three groupings: a first group includes Austria, Germany, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, characterized by the presence of absolute delinking. This result is as 
expected for Austria and Germany, which are leaders in the waste sector and waste management 
and  show  performances  above  the EU  average. Germany’s  national waste  policy  encourages 
implementation of EU waste directives
20. The evidence for the three other countries, is more 
unexpected. From the graphical evidence plotted in the appendix figures, we believe that only 
Spain can be associated with real absolute delinking, while Greece and Portugal show respectively 
stabilization  of  waste  generation,  and  an  N  shape  which  could  derive  partly  from  waste 
accounting ‘data distortions’ in some years, a fact which is plausible in the waste arena.
21 The 
turning point is always inside the range, and relative at quite high levels of income, except in the 
case  of  Germany,  which  is  consistently  associated  with  a  very  low  turning  point  (1,633  €). 
Germany preceded and influenced EU policy by achieving higher performance through diffuse 
and stringent policy introduced in the early 1990s (EEA, [22]).   
                                                           
19 We attempted some estimates including DENSPOP and POLIND, which showed lower performance in terms of 
statistical fit of the model. 
20  Germany  role  and  behavior  depends  on  both  a  country  real  commitment  on  green  strategies  –  waste  and 
renewables among others   and eco innovations, often fostered by regulatory interventions and public funding, and 
by idiosyncratic energy related country aspects. This green competitive advantage, though generating high national 
compliance costs, it is also a driver of the high tech / green contents of german export leading performances in the 
EU. An anecdote of Germany influence was the 1989 Toepfer law setting strict objectives on packaging waste 
recycling  and  recovery  and  producer  responsability,  which  drove  the  1994  Packaging  EU  Directive  given  the 
necessity of an homogenization of packaging laws to avoid trade distortions in the common market. On the energy 
side, the commitment of Germany on renewables energy, waste recycling and eco innovations depend on the scarcity 
of national sources. UK instead has placed lighter emphasis on recycling – mainly plastic   given the abundance of 
oil. This is an endowment based reasoning that explains the value of investigating country specific evidence in detail. 
All in all, Germany leadership is not undermined by this consideration: other countries such as Italy are not rich in 
energy sources but adopted far lighter green strategies. 
21 We refer the reader to Tables A2 3 in the Appendix, for graphical plots.    19
A second group for countries, characterized by the presence of relative delinking, includes the 
United Kingdom and The Netherlands. In this case there is a turning point, but it is out of the 
possible range of income. 
The remaining countries, in the third group, show no evidence of delinking, but with differences 
among them. Coefficients are not highly significant for Belgium, Denmark
22 and France, but 
specific time series analysis conducted on these countries   not included here for reasons of space 
   shows  an  increasing  and  significant  relationship.
23  Italy  and  Sweden  show  a  U  shaped 
relationship, characterized by a clear positive marginal effect. Overall, the tendency in this last 
group is for an increasing relationship between waste and income. 
To summaries, SURE analyses are only able to identify differences across European countries 
that are hidden in the fixed effects estimation. In particular we see that, letting the slopes free to 
move across the different individual countries, we can categorise countries in three groups, based 
on the big differences among them. From a statistical point of view this result is also confirmed 
by the F test presented in the final line of Table 4, which confirms that letting the slopes move 
freely across countries provides more valuable information.
24   
                                                           
22  Denmark  performance  may  be  influenced  by  the  fact  that  construction  and  demolition  waste  were  recently 
accounted  as  MSW.  This  shows  how  data  commensurability  is  an  issue  in  waste  statistics.  Within  EU15  data 
commensurability is good, while data availability and commensurability are two points that for the time being does 
not allow a full integration of EU12 countries into the analysis.   
23 Analogously, an unconstrained SURE with only consumption as the main economic driver shows a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between income and waste generated. These results are not shown for reasons of 
space, but confirm the absence of delinking for Belgium, Denmark and Finland.  
24 The test follows an F statistic, and tests the hypothesis of slope homogeneity (under the null).    20
Tab 4   Waste generated. SURE Model, unconstrained model 
Countries  CONS  CONS2  TP [€]  Delinking evidence 
Austria  84.31***   4.33***  16,646.52  Absolute 
Belgium   3.73  0.210  7,075.36   No delinking 
Denmark   11.26  0.62  8,051.13  No delinking 
France  3.57   0.17  33,767.68  No delinking 
Germany  1.89***   0.12***  1,633.113  Absolute 
Greece  17.36***   0.91***  13,548.99  Absolute 
Italy   8.73***  0.487***  7,842.28  No delinking 
The Netherlands  9.28***   0.47***  16,578.1  Relative 
Portugal  8.89***   0.48***  9,983.131  Absolute 
Spain  24.03***   1.29***  10,885.79  Absolute 
Sweden   17.5***  0.96***  8,700.899  No delinking 
United Kingdom  5.09***   0.25***  21,529.84  Relative 
Breusch Pagan test of independence (chi2) = 0.000                         F test of slope homogeneity = 0.000 
Note:. (…) means not included; significance at 10%, 5% and 1%  denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively; SURE estimations refers 
only to 12 countries. Breusch Pagan tests for cross sectional independence in the residuals, while the F test is a test of slope 
homogeneity. 
 
Some countries were able, during the period analysed, to reduce the amount of waste and to 
change  the  income  environment  relationship,  promoting  a  process  of  delinking,  driven  by 
structural  and  policy  factors.  At  the  same  time,  some  other  countries  show  an  increasing 
relationship,  in  which  an  increase  in  income  is  combining  with  an  increasing  trend  in  total 
amount of waste generated.
25 This evidence, which will be become more robust in future years 
from adding years to the already valuable EU waste time series, in our view should be very useful 
                                                           
25 From a different but complementary perspective, we calculate the delinking indexes following the OECD [60] 
formula, which we present in the appendix (Fig A1). (SURE) econometric analysis is definitely a more robust way to 
assess delinking.    21
for the EU Commission and member states in transition for fixing a set of country diversified 
targets and policy tools on waste generation, under the umbrella of the waste framework directive 
and EU regulatory guideline.   
 
3.2 Waste landfilled 
The relationship was hypothesised to be bell shaped, in accordance with the previsions of the 
more traditional WKC studies. In fact, on average, although some EU15 countries are still 
increasing their share of landfill
26 – due to policy failure and land based idiosyncratic features, 
and heterogeneity is rather striking across Europe (figure 2), shares of landfilled waste have been 
constantly  decreasing  since  the  mid  1990s,  when  EUROSTAT  data  began  to  be  collected. 
Therefore, we can expect to find a bell shape or even a strictly negative relationship in the 
turning points for most countries.  
This expectation is confirmed by the following results, suggesting that from an EU average 
viewpoint, the period 1995 2007 is already on the descending side of the inverted U shape 
relationship, as far as the relationship between landfill and economic growth is concerned. The 
estimation results presented in Table 5 confirm the presence of an absolute delinking, with a 
turning point corresponding to relatively low levels of income (turning point varies between 
6,976€ and 12,637€ across specifications).  Moving to the additional covariates, we see that 
population  density  is  never  significant.  This  result  is  counterintuitive;  we  would  expect 
population density to be a proxy for the opportunity (economic) cost of land, and for this 
reason highly correlated to landfill diversion. Nevertheless, previous studies (Mazzanti et al., 
[52]) based on a shorter dataset find similar results for European countries, while they find a 
                                                           
26 Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and surprisingly Denmark and the Netherlands, actually show a U shape, where the 
lowest peak around 2005 is followed by slight increase in landfilling (a recoupling in technical terms) over 2006 2007, 
which is sound to some extent, given that these were two years of robust economic growth. Recall that the social 
benefit cost ratio of landfilling relative to other options is highly idiosyncratic (Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, [19]).   22
negative  significant  relationship  between  population  density  and  waste  landfilled  in  a  wider 
EU25 analysis. 
The inclusion of socio economic and policy drivers does not alter the results of the core 
specification,  but  adds  some  interesting  elements.  Regarding  the  policy  proxy,  both 
environmental  taxation  effect
27  and  the waste  policy  index  are  statistically  significant.
28 This 
means that the policy efforts implemented so far at national level, have promoted a stronger 
delinking between waste landfilled and domestic consumption.  
Tab 5  Landfilled Waste: Fixed effects model  
  FEM  FEM  FEM  FEM 
CONS  32.65**  23.80**  16.06**  31.33** 
CONS2   1.82**   1.26**   0.92**   1.77** 
DENSPOP  5.23  3.11  1.66  6.71 
POLIND  …   1.64***  …  … 
EMS  …  …  5.92  … 
ENVTAX  …  …  …   0.74** 
         
TP [€]  7,86187  12,637.76  …  6,976.3 
Pesaran test  0.0353  0.0141  0.0255  0.0447 
F test  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Note: In all the estimation we use. the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance and adjusted for correlations in the error terms over time 
within individuals (but not across individuals). This means that we consider that Var(εit) = σ2εit   i=1,.., N, t=1,…,T, and that Cov(εit, εis) ≠ 0    t 
≠ s. (…) means not included; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively; F test shows overall significance for all 
regressions; R squared presents reasonably high values for panel settings. EMAS data are available only for the period 1997 2007, and the EMAS 
estimation does not include Germany because it is a strong outlier. Environmental tax data are not available for year 1995.   
 
This is an important result because it underlines the potentially high level of effectiveness of – 
decentralised   European policy, in terms of diverting waste from landfill. Policies help in the 
effort  to  tunnel  through  the  business as usual,    endogenous  delinking  trend  that  is  driven  by 
economic drivers. Only EMAS do not have a significant coefficient, which is evidence that a high 
number rate of certificated firms and technologies is still not associated with better performances 
of waste management and disposal. 
                                                           
27 Recall that environmental taxation net of energy is mostly landfill taxation, around 80% of that for example in 
Italy. 
28  Since  we  suspected  the  presence  endogeneity  of  policy  commitment  with  regard  to  income  levels,  we 
implemented three different consistency tests, presented in the Appendix in Table A3. The first two respectively 
use the first and the second lags of POLIND as the policy proxy, the third includes POLIND instrumented with its 
lag. The tests confirmed the results obtained in the main analysis.    23
Even for landfilling the results of the Pesaran and Breusch Pagan tests confirm the presence of  
contemporaneous correlations across cross sectional units. Table 6 summarises the results for the 
constrained SURE.
29 The core specification confirms our previous result of absolute delinking, 
but with an even lower turning point (1,659.39€). In terms of averages, this mean that 1995 2007 
is already along the descending side of the inverted U shape relationship. 
 
Table 6 – SUR: landfilled waste 
  Constrained SUR  Constrained SUR – all covariates 
CONS  1.49***  4.27*** 
CONS2   0.10***   0.19*** 
 
DENSPOP  …   3.68*** 
POLIND  …   0.82*** 
TP [€]  1,659.39  47,328.06 
Breusch Pagan test of independence (chi2)  0.000  0.000 
Note:. (…) means not included; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively; SURE estimations refers only to 12 
countries. 
 
New and more interesting elements emerge from the other specifications, again showing the 
presence of a delinking trend, but this time associated with a high and out of range turning point 
(47,328€, while the income range is 5,700 28,400€). This specification also sheds new light on the 
variable population density, which now is highly significant from both an economic and statistical 
point of view (the size of the parameter is larger than in the waste generation case, higher than 3) 
and negatively related to landfilled waste. Both the opportunity costs linked to the higher value of 
land in densely populated and urban areas (value of land, of commercial activities a crowded out 
by landfill sites, and other public investments), and the higher externality costs in more densely 
populated areas, ceteris paribus, seem to be driving down the use of landfill as a disposal option. 
                                                           
29 As before, SURE refers only to 12 of the 15 countries. The countries with the lowest levels of waste to landfill, i.e. 
Luxembourg (61.904 Kg); Sweden (191.378 Kg) and Belgium (222.275 Kg), are dropped.    24
Moreover,  the  policy  index  is  again  significant  and  associated  with  a  negative  coefficient  of 
relevant size. This new insight, combined with the high significance of the policy related variable, 
probably  explain  the  progression  from  the  previous  strong  absolute  delinking  to  the  relative 
delinking found in this last specification. To summarise, the use of a constrained SURE model in 
this analysis would suggest that  the baseline income waste relationship does not on its own 
explain landfill diversion. Other forces, such as population density, impact on waste performance. 
This  does  not  infringe  the  core  evidence  we  found  to  support  the  general  effectiveness  of 
environmental and waste policy efforts in driving down disposal by landfill. 
Finally, Table 7 presents the results of the fully unconstrained SURE model. The regression 
results  generally  confirm  the  previous  evidence  of  a  bell shaped  income landfill  diversion 
relationship,  with  the  exceptions  of  Spain,  the  Netherlands  and  Denmark  –  three  cases  of 
relatively worse performance envisaged above. All the other countries analysed show an absolute 
delinking in the waste income relationship over the considered period.  
In Denmark and the Netherlands, although in both countries there is geographical space for 
landfilling, the U shape seems to be capturing  some statistical irregularities (see figures A2 3) 
within a still clear absolute delinking over the entire period.
30 Spain is the only case that does not 
show a clear ‘marginal effect’, that is more in line with the evidence of relative delinking. In other 
words, the size of the two estimated coefficients leads to a calculated weight of CONS and 
CONS
2 biased towards the former. This is the only case where the turning point is within the 
estimated range.  
 The country specific evidence from the SURE model shows its potential for interpreting ex post 
dynamics and informing future policy. The threat of a recoupling is looming even for countries 
with relatively good performance.  
                                                           
30 The TP for Denmark and The Netherlands is slightly outside the range of values. Delinking is thus absolute.    25
Table 7   Unconstrained  SUR   landfilled waste 
  CONS  CONS2  TP [€]  Delinking 
Austria  3.71***   0.33***  269.7  Absolute 
Denmark   120.6***  6.05***  21,160  Absolute 
Finland  43.74***   2.32***  12,296.32  Absolute 
France  84.01***   4.45***  12,358.26  Absolute 
Germany  12.97***   1.3***  142.27  Absolute 
Greece  17.38***   0.92***  12,210.49  Absolute 
Ireland  15.59***   0.82***  12,204.52  Absolute 
Italy  22.7***   1.25***  8,642.7  Absolute 
The Netherlands   144.14**  7.28**  19,837.1  Absolute 
Portugal  40.9***   2.27***  8,052.68  Absolute 
Spain   10.14***  0.54***  10,209.04  Relative 
United Kingdom  48.21***   2.54***  12,930.44  Absolute 
 
Breusch Pagan test of independence (chi2) = 0.000,                                                        
F test of slope homogeneity = 0.000 
Note:. (…) means not included; significance at 10%, 5% and 1% denoted by *, ** and ***, respectively; SURE estimations refers 




3.3 Simulating policy effects 
Along similar lines as in Cole et al. [15], we explore as a final investigation the effect of what 
could have occurred to the delinking process if structural and policy variables were in 1995 at 
their 2007 level. Using a two stage procedure, it is possible to asses the degree to which 1995 
waste generation and waste landfilled quantities would have changed, if the three main variables 
were at their 2007 level, holding the other variables constant. We calculated the predicted values 
of our core relationships using 1995 data, and in the second step, we replaced 1995 data relative 
to the three variables of interest (policy index, population density and environmental taxation   26
over consumption) with their 2007 values. In this way, it is possible to measure the effect of 2007 
regulation and population density on 1995 waste indicators.  
Table 8 indicates that the effect of the policy indicator is positive and associated to a negative 
sign in both cases, but with a higher coefficient in the case of landfilled waste. This is an expected 
result, considering that previous models underlined that policy index is strongly related to waste 
landfilled but is not able to promote landfill prevention. In other terms, we can read this result as 
the  effect  of  2007  regulation  on  1995 waste  performances,  coming  to  the  conclusion  that a 
stronger regulation would have had a significant effect in reducing the amount of waste landfilled. 
A different and probably unexpected result, is given by the environmental tax, that shows a 
positive result for both MSW generated and Landfilled. Even though these results may seems 
counterintuitive,  given  the  strong  link  found  up  to  date  between  regulation  and  waste 
performances, we have to note here that the level of environmental taxation with respect to 
income has a decreasing path over the time period analysed, i.e. the share of environmental 
taxation on income is lower in 2007 than in 1995. This is a well known fact in the EU policy 
arena: environmental and energy taxes have shown stable or decreasing paths on average, with 
many countries witnessing reductions in real terms. In other terms, the results in the previous 
table  stress  the  importance  of  environmental  regulation,  showing  that  2007  taxation  (slightly 
lower than 1995 level) has a positive effect on 1995 level of both waste generated and waste 
landfilled. Analogously, the results for population density show a positive relationship in the case 
of waste generation and a negative one in the case of waste to landfill, in line with previous result. 
Summarizing, we have seen here that policy levers has definitely been on of the main responsible 
of the process of landfill diversion, and that a stringent regulation starting from 1995 would have 
reduced the amount of waste landfilled quite consistently.   
 
   27
Table 8 – Simulation effects 
  MSW GENER  MSW LAND 
POLIND   0.0161   1.006 
ENVTAX  0.0210  0.0905 
DENSPOP  0.0432   0.2599 
Results are statistically significant and are calculated using fixed effect predicted values. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper provides new evidence on the socio economic and policy drivers of two main 
waste variables, waste generation and landfill diversion, by exploiting a fairly long and highly 
original,  country based,  panel  dataset  for  the  EU15.  The  environment  is  relevant  given  the 
increasing strictness of waste policies in the EU, promoted by Germany’s leadership since the 
mid 1990s. We focus on the period 1995 2007 since there is good availability of data. The lens we 
use is mainly ex post effectiveness of policy action, but we also look at the future in relation to 
the current transition in the implementation of waste prevention policy targets in addition to the 
already  adopted  disposal  based  (landfill  diversion)  and  management  based  (recycling  and 
recovery) targets. 
Given the strong decentralization of environmental policy in the EU, use of the SURE model 
is coherent with the need to investigate both average EU performance and national trends in 
waste income  performance  and  the  effectiveness  of  waste  and  environmental  policies  more 
generally. 
The  evidence  shows  that  although  waste  generation income  macroeconomic  elasticity  has 
decreased compared to several years ago, neither environmental taxes nor specific waste policy 
efforts have produced substantial ‘absolute delinking’. As expected and in line with currently 
available  forecasting  figures,  waste  generation  is  increasing.  Given  that  member  states  must 
propose new waste strategies by 2013, including specific waste prevention targets, we need to 
take urgent action on how to shape efficient and effective policies targeted at reducing waste   28
generated  per  GDP  and  per  capita,  in  order  to  complement  established  but  evidently  not 
sufficient waste management and disposal targets.  
It  should  be  noted  that  SURE,  as  expected,  increases  efficiency  while  not  affecting 
substantially the economic meaning of the results, and also that population density seems to drive 
down  waste  generation.  This  should  be  taken  into  account  in  considering  the  relationship 
between endogenous changes such as increasing urbanization and waste generation. Although it 
enhances the statistical significance of density, the more efficient estimation provided by SURE 
does not change the result that environmental and waste policy actions are ineffective. Even 
more market based actions, such as diffusion of EMS in a country, possibly related to its waste 
and  material  reduction  strategy,  seem  to  be  ineffective.  However,  the  EU  situation  is  highly 
dynamic, and shows increased adoption of environmental policies in recent years, but still with 
Germany as an absolute outlier and most of the rest of Europe lagging far behind.  
In terms of the possibility of identifying ‘groupings’ of countries through the unconstrained 
SURE procedures, we find that EU15 waste generation–income relationship encompasses three 
main groups: the first is Austria, Germany, Greece, Portugal and Spain, characterized by the 
presence of absolute delinking. This result is as expected based on the fact that Austria and 
Germany are leaders in the waste sector and in waste management and show performances above 
the EU average. The presence in this group of the three other countries is surprising. We believe 
that only Spain can be associated to a real absolute delinking, while Greece and Portugal show 
stabilization in waste generation, and an N shape respectively. The second group of countries, 
which  is  characterized  by  the  presence  of  a  relative  delinking,  is  composed  of  the  United 
Kingdom and The Netherlands.  
The remaining countries show no evidence of delinking, but with differences among them. Italy 
and Sweden show a U shaped relationship, characterized by a clear positive marginal effect. 
Overall, the tendency in this last group is towards an increasing relationship between waste and 
income.   29
The picture is different for landfilled waste. For most countries, a turning point was achieved in 
the Mid 1990s. We find that environmental tax – mainly based on landfill taxation – and pure 
waste  based  national  strategies  captured  by  the  policy  index affect  landfill  diversion with  an 
economic and statistical high significance. The EU strategy based mainly on disposal targets, 
which was implemented by the Landfill Directive in 1999, and some anticipatory action by more 
virtuous countries (Nordic countries, Germany) is being effective. However, it is not having an 
effect on the core issue of preventing waste from being produced. 
Population density, as expected, is a significant structural factor driving down landfilled waste, for 
reasons associated with to the often very high economic opportunity costs of landfill sites and the 
higher  environmental  social  costs  in  densely  populated  areas.  The  economic  significance  of 
estimated coefficients is comparatively higher with regard its effect on waste generation, than on 
landfilling, in the end. 
A bell shaped income landfill diversion relationship emerges for all countries, except Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark. If for Denmark and the Netherlands, though both countries may 
possess land space for landfilling, the U shape seems capturing  more statistical irregularities 
within a still clear absolute delinking over the entire period, Spain is the only case showing a not 
clear  ‘marginal  effect’,  more  in  line  with  an  evidence  of  relative  delinking.  Nevertheless,  we 
highlight that our results suggest as real the possibility of recoupling which may be relevant also 
for countries with relatively good environmental performance over the past. For instance, the 
evidence we capture for Denmark and The Netherlands may drive the attention on a potential 
future real recoupling.    
  Future  research  could  extend  waste  economics  by  focusing  on  unexplored  issues  such  as 
transboundary  shipments  of waste, which would overlap  the  trade  and environmental  policy 
fields, the spatial dimensions of waste flows across countries and within regions, new assessments 
and policy indicators, the influence of socio demographic trends in forecasting scenarios, the role 
of the waste market structure in explaining waste related performance, and differences between   30
advanced countries such as the EU15, and EU transition economies that are only entering the 
sphere of marked based environmental policy.  
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Appendix 
A1   Waste generated and waste landfilled (kg) 
  
Table A2 – fixed effects estimates with policy lags and IV: waste generation  
  Lagged estimation  IV estimation 
CONS  0,38***  0,35***  0,39*** 
DENSPOP  0,05  0,04  0,05 
POLIND (lag1)   0,04  …  … 
POLIND (lag2)  …   0,04  … 
POLIND  …  …   0,05 
 
Table A3  fixed effects estimates with policy lags and IV: landfilled waste 
  Lagged estimation  IV estimation 
CONS  20.13***  15.39  21.95*** 
CONS2   1.07***   0.81   1.15*** 
DENSPOP  3.53  3.88  3.35 
POLIND (lag1)   1.70***  …  … 
POLIND (lag2)  …   1.83***  … 
POLIND  …  …   2.10*** 
TP  12,167.72  13,359.73  13,953.40 
   36
Figure A1 – Delinking indexes for waste generation and landfilling – OECD (2002) 
Waste generation  
 
Landfilling  
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